ABSTRACT Social programmes in Peru have been plagued historically by a culture of dependency, clientelism and corruption. Juntos, a conditional cash transfer programme targeting children under the age of 14, was initiated in 2005 to provide a new model for social protection provision and tackle the country's widespread childhood poverty. Its design largely follows that of counterpart Latin American programmes and seeks to address the risks to children's future human capital development that stem from inadequate access to basic services and various forms of social exclusion. An innovative dimension of Juntos is its explicit focus on populations most affected by the country's political violence during the 1980s and 1990s. Drawing on document analysis and qualitative fi eld research, this independent assessment considers the impacts of the programme on childhood poverty, the strengths and weaknesses of a conditional approach, and changes in intra-household and community dynamics as well as state-citizen relations. It concludes by discussing policy challenges and directions for future research.
I. INTRODUCTION
Social protection mechanisms are increasingly seen as an important policy tool to tackle poverty, vulnerability and social exclusion.
(1) Within the broad fi eld of social protection, cash transfers are instruments that attract much interest and attention and have been pioneered particularly in Latin America.
(2) Peru recently followed the examples of Mexico, Chile, Brazil and Nicaragua in launching its fi rst conditional cash transfer programme, Juntos ("Together"), in February 2005. By targeting poor children under the age of 14, the aim is to promote human capital development and help break life course and inter-generational transfers of poverty by facilitating households' capacities to ensure children's rights to adequate nutrition, health care and education.
Although the need for greater public investment in social services was widely recognized as critical to addressing the country's stark inequalities,(3) President Toledo's announcement about the introduction of the programme sparked opposition from various societal stakeholders. This was due in part to Toledo's low popularity rankings and suspicions that the programme would be used for clientelistic purposes in the preelection period leading up to the April 2006 national elections. concerns included the government's plan to implement the programme simultaneously in rural and urban areas without having determined a clear mechanism for targeting the poor, (4) and the lack of involvement of key social and political actors represented in the country's post-authoritarian National Accord.
(5) Some analysts also argued that existing social programmes should be restructured rather than initiating a new programme. The government, however, countered that such cash transfer programmeswhereby mothers receive a regular cash payment on the condition that they ensure their children access public education and health services and avail themselves of other child-focused social programmes -have been successful internationally. Moreover, they argued that there was evidence to suggest that direct cash subsidies were more effective than food subsidies and entailed lower operational costs.
In order to address critics' concerns, Juntos was placed under a directorate named by the national Roundtable for Poverty Reduction, (6) so as to guarantee the programme's neutrality and transparency and to ensure the participation of the principle social sectors involved in shaping the direction of social policy. Juntos has since gained considerable legitimacy, due to minimal politicization, and a growing social consensus about the value of this innovative approach to social protection for the poorest, emphasizing co-responsibility for social programmes between citizens and the state. Not only is the programme reaching the most vulnerable and marginalized segments of the population, but there is also recognition that Juntos is an attempt to address some of the particular vulnerabilities faced by populations that were most affected by the political violence of the 1980s to 2000 (both from the Shining Path terrorist organization and state counter-terrorism).
This paper discusses the development and implementation of Juntos in Peru to date, drawing on research in Ayacucho department, the fi rst region where the pilot phase of the programme was implemented. The analysis pays particular attention to the impacts of the programme on childhood poverty, the strengths and weaknesses of a conditional approach, and changes in intra-household and community dynamics -both intended and unintended. Following a brief discussion of methods in Section II, Section III provides an overview of the conceptual understanding of risk and vulnerability that underpins the programme. Section IV describes the coverage, targeting and fi nancing of Juntos, and Section V analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of its implementation. Section VI presents participants' perceptions of the programme, including changing intrahousehold dynamics, while Section VII is concerned with shifting community dynamics. Conclusions and policy implications are presented in Section VIII.
II. METHODS
This paper draws on document analysis and qualitative research in two communities in Ayacucho department. These communities -Arizona and Rosaspata -were selected on the basis of:
• overlap with the longitudinal international Young Lives project research sites, and the potential to follow up the impacts of social protection initiatives on children over time; • geographical accessibility; and • the proportion of children from the community who were enrolled in the programme.
Two rounds of fi eldwork involving a total of eight focus group discussions and 42 individual semi-structured interviews with adult and child benefi ciaries and non-benefi ciaries, service providers and programme offi cials at the national and local levels were undertaken in July/August 2006, and again in January 2007. Save the Children UK's ethical guidelines for working with children were followed in all interviews with children, and a Quechua translator led the interviews where study participants preferred to speak in Quechua rather than Spanish.
III. CONCEPTUALIZING RISK AND VULNERABILITY
Central to the concept of social protection is a concern with reducing risk and vulnerability by enhancing poor people's capacities to avoid, cope with and/or recover from adverse shocks.
(8) Importantly, it recognizes poverty as a dynamic rather than a static state and that poverty may be temporary, transitory or chronic.
(9) However, given the multi-dimensionality of factors that underpin poverty and deprivation, there is considerable debate among analysts about how vulnerability and risk should best be defi ned, ranging from a narrow economic/livelihoods approach through to a broad multi-faceted defi nition including equity, non-discrimination, empowerment and sociocultural and political rights.
(10) In the case of children, the conceptual debate is even more challenging. Vulnerability may be used to refer to:
• children pre-defi ned as particularly vulnerable (e.g. orphans, street children, victims of traffi cking); • children as a general demographic group; or • it may include multiple dimensions -both broader community and household environmental, political and economic vulnerabilities as well as child-specifi c aspects, including vulnerabilities related to education/skills acquirement, health, sociocultural norms and practices (e.g. discrimination against girls or disabled children) as well as particular policy decisions (e.g. institutionalization, user fees for basic services).
With a focus on children in poor households and communities, Juntos (the national programme of support to the poorest) is implicitly underpinned by a mix of the second and third defi nitions of vulnerability, combining a concern with poor children in general with more disaggregated dimensions of household and child-specifi c vulnerabilities in the context of high levels of national inequality. Despite rapid national economic growth over the last 15 years (1993-1997 and 2001-2006) , (12) Peru is one of the most unequal countries in Latin America, which is the world's most unequal continent.
(13) Stark inequalities are manifest not only in terms of income distribution (14) but also in terms of human development indicators and access to basic services (Box 1). Children are particularly at risk, with two out of every three children under the age of fi ve in Peru living below the poverty line, and two out of 10 living in extreme poverty.
(15) Within this context, Juntos seeks to address the Maternal and infant mortality National averages for indicators of maternal and infant health hide the grave disparities in Ayacucho. The rate of maternal mortality in Ayacucho is 304.7 per 100,000, almost double the national average (163.9 per 100,000), (3) and only 41.5 per cent of pregnant mothers receive the nationally recommended minimum of four pre-natal check-ups. The rate of infant mortality in Ayacucho is 50 per 1,000 live births and the rate of mortality for children under the age of five is 68 per 1,000, in both cases higher than the national average (43 and 60 per 1,000, respectively). 
Child malnutrition
Malnutrition indices are also alarming: one in three children under the age of five in the region suffers from chronic malnutrition, (5) which limits not only their survival prospects but also longer-term physical and cognitive development. In Ayacucho, 40.1 per cent of all children suffer from chronic malnutrition and 52.7 per cent are anaemic.
Education
In the case of primary education, the main problem is quality, as access is close to universal (93 per cent in Ayacucho, compared to 96 per cent at the national level).
(6) Problems are related predominantly to multi-grade and single-teacher schools and a lack of appropriate curricula for such schools. This contributes to high levels of grade repetition and dropouts in areas with high levels of poverty. Threequarters of students in areas of poverty are over-age (50 per cent in urban areas and 60 per cent in rural areas). 
MINEDU (2004) Americana (APRA) won 52.6 per cent of the vote compared to the Unión por el Perú (UPP)'s 47. 4 per cent, in many of the poorest districts, the UPP enjoyed a decisive victory, as shown in Table 1 .
Finally, unlike other social protection programmes, Juntos also explicitly conceptualizes vulnerability in relation to Peru's recent history of political violence. It is seen as a way of tackling the particular vulnerabilities of populations who were most affected by the political violence prevalent in the country between 1980 and 2000, when 69,280 Peruvians were killed. Most of the victims were from poor rural communities, many were Quechua speakers and more than 40 per cent were from Ayacucho department.
(17) Accordingly, when the programme was launched in September 2005, the fi rst community selected -Chuschi -was symbolic, because this was the area where the terrorist organization, the Shining Path, carried out its fi rst act of terrorism in the 1980s.
IV. PROGRAMME COVERAGE, TARGETING AND FINANCING a. Coverage
Eligible households in the Juntos programme receive a fi xed monthly cash transfer of 100 soles (approximately US$ 30) per month irrespective of household size, (18) which is conditional on their compliance with accessing basic public services for their children. The programme is targeted specifi cally at households below the poverty line who have children under the age of 14 (including widows/widowers, grandparents and guardians). The transfer is paid to mothers on the assumption that they are likely to be more accountable for ensuring their children's well-being. (19) In return, women sign an agreement with the state for a maximum of four years and agree to:
• complete civic identifi cation documents for themselves and their children; (20) • ensure 85 per cent school attendance for their children;
• complete vaccination, health and pre-and post-natal care checks;
• take advantage of the National Nutritional Assistance programme package for children under the age of three, and use chlorinated water and anti-parasite medication; and • attend capacity-building/awareness-raising programmes on how to promote their children's physical and educational development, both Benefi ciaries are issued with ID cards, which they need to take to the Banco Nacional to receive their monthly payments. The bank holds a centralized list of eligible benefi ciaries to prevent fraud and, despite initial concerns about theft and trickery to which a number of women fall prey, eligible women are paid the money in the lowest denominations of local currency. The cash transfers are suspended for three months in cases of non-compliance, and indefi nitely if there is further non-compliance.
b. Targeting mechanisms
Targeting comprises three stages: geographic targeting, household targeting and a process of community validation of potential benefi ciaries. In the fi rst stage, four criteria are used to effi ciently identify the poorest districts in the country: extreme income poverty; access to infrastructure and basic services (e.g. roads, electricity, water, sanitation); level of chronic infant malnutrition; and a history of political violence. (22) The data are compiled from the Ministry of Finance and Economics, FONCODES (Fondo Nacional de Cooperacion para el Desarrollo) poverty maps, the national census and the Report on the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, to identify the areas most affected by violence during the 1980s and 1990s.
Within the geographic areas selected in stage one, the second stage -household targeting -is based on a social demographic questionnaire designed and implemented by the National Statistics Offi ce (INEI), and combined with an algorithm to establish the poverty line (the cut-off point between the poor and non-poor). This process has, however, generated some problems given the general level of poverty in areas where Juntos is being established. Because the algorithm does not adequately distinguish between qualifying and non-qualifying families (in some cases, the difference is a mere fraction of a percent), it has resulted in problems of leakage (selecting families who should not qualify) as well as under-coverage of families in extreme poverty.
The fi nal stage -community validation -involves bringing together the community and local authorities along with representatives from the departments of health and education and the Roundtable for Poverty Reduction. The aim is to identify whether the fi rst two stages accurately refl ect reality, for example, allowing for the exclusion of traders, noncommunity members and those with a certain level of personal property/ goods on the one hand, or the inclusion of impoverished families who were erroneously excluded on the other. This is important, as once the list of benefi ciaries has been publicly displayed it is almost impossible to reverse the decision.
The pressure to implement the programme in the fi rst communities selected generated a series of problems, in part because of the geographic isolation and dispersed population in the poorest rural areas. In some cases, interviews were carried out in public places rather than people's homes or workplaces, resulting in a breach of confi dentiality. Benefi ciaries also often lacked the requisite information to fi ll out the INEI questionnaire and/or were required to travel considerable distances and forgo agricultural or pastoral work. These design fl aws, coupled with inaccurate recording of information by interviewers who lacked suffi cient knowledge about local 19. This follows Mexico's Progresa/Oportunidades' successful approach of directing cash transfers through mothers, not only because women are seen to be more in tune with, and take primary responsibility for, children's care but also in order to provide women with greater bargaining and decision-making power (through control of economic resources). The extent to which this leads to a transformation of gender relations in the family, or merely exacerbates women's work burden, is however increasingly debated. See, for example, reference 2, Molyneux (2007) . 20. Having a national identity document was made a realities, meant that approximately 20 per cent of those who completed the questionnaire should have been covered by the programme but were not. Many of these initial problems, however, have since been addressed.
The validation assemblies -seen as one of Juntos's successes -have not been problem-free either. Although they have served to fi lter out approximately 10 per cent of the households initially selected (e.g. those who were somewhat better off due to the ownership of petty businesses or of larger quantities of livestock), our qualitative fi ndings revealed that villagers were often reluctant to speak out about who should be excluded from the programme, because of community power relations. Similarly, although education and health sector personnel have served as important allies to validate programme benefi ciaries -given their general familiarity with the living conditions of families in the area -our interviews suggested that they are often not invited to the validation assemblies, and sometimes received insults and threats when they refused to fi ll out registration forms for families residing outside the community.
c. Financing
Although still a relatively small programme, fi nancing has steadily increased over time. In 2005, Law No 28562 provided for 120 million soles (approximately US$ 38 million) to fi nance the programme's pilot phase, which covered 110 districts in the regions of Huancavelica, Ayacucho, Apurímac and Huánuco. In 2006, a total of 300 million soles (approximately US$ 95 million) was allocated to the expansion phase (including 210 new districts), to broaden coverage in the original four regions and in fi ve additional regions: Puno, Cajamarca, La Libertad, Junín and Ancash. The budget was split as follows: 60 per cent to pay for the cash transfers; 30 per cent to strengthen the supply of basic services, (23) especially to meet the new demand generated by participation in Juntos; and the remaining 10 per cent to be spent on operational costs, which is low compared to equivalent programmes in Mexico and Chile. (24) Initial doubts notwithstanding, the new Alan Garcia administration has expanded the programme signifi cantly. Whereas 135,000 households were receiving transfers by September 2006, by the end of 2007 it is expected that 350,000 households will be covered, across 638 districts in 14 regions. 
V. IMPLEMENTATION STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
The institutional design of Juntos has been carefully thought out in order to overcome a number of the key problems that plague the implementation of other social programmes in Peru. These include problems of politicization, clientelism, corruption and leakage, (27) a lack of synergies across sectors, and inadequate reach to the poorest and most vulnerable sectors of the population. Key characteristics of Juntos's institutional design are:
• a centralized directorate managed by one of the most powerful central government agencies, the Presidential Council of Ministers; • mechanisms to promote inter-sectoral coordination; • the creation of a rigorous data collection system to monitor compliance with the programme conditionalities; and • community-level programme facilitators.
Whereas other social programmes in Peru are under the relatively weak and poorly resourced Ministry of Women and Social Development (MIMDES), Juntos was placed under the Presidential Council of Ministers in order to ensure effi cient implementation and promote an inter-sectoral approach to the implementation of the programme. It is managed by a directorate comprised of a president, four civil society representatives who are part of the National Accord, (28) and representatives of the ministries of education, health, women and social development, and economy and fi nance. The directorate approves the programme's policies and intervention strategies and meets periodically to address priority themes, such as problems in meeting the demand for services generated by Juntos and attempts to politicize the programme. At the local level, the inter-sectoral focus is promoted through multi-sectoral technical committees, which are responsible for fostering linkages between the programme, the various sectors and the Roundtable for Poverty Reduction (RPR).
The administrative and implementation functions of the programme -such as registering households, (29) certifying compliance with the programme's conditions, and the transfer of cash payments -are overseen by the executive director. S/he is in turn supported by a technical committee and regional and district coordinators, as well as programme facilitators selected through a competitive public process overseen by the RPR.
(30) The latter are predominantly women who are part of the benefi ciary population and elected by an assembly.
(31) Selected largely based on their (admittedly often minimal) literacy and bilingual skills and social networks within the community, their role is to link families to public services, give public talks about Juntos, and verify families' compliance with the programme.
Monitoring and evaluation of the benefi ciaries' compliance with the conditions attached to receipt of the cash transfers is a critical part of the implementation design. In order to facilitate this, an information system has been designed whereby barcodes are used to allow direct access to data on each programme benefi ciary (mothers and children). Moreover, the system has the potential to synthesize information related to other social programmes that currently lack an adequate registry of benefi ciaries. The monitoring function of the programme is overseen by the Committee on Supervision and Transparency, which comprises members of the church and civil society, (32) in close coordination with provincial and district RPRs.
(33) Although present in only a small sub-sample of programme communities and still lacking adequate funds to function properly, these committees have been effective in the early detection of diverse problems, including: deals between teachers and parents to cover up mutual absences from school; professionals charging benefi ciaries for fi lling out programme paperwork; the use of cash transfers to purchase alcohol; and mistreatment on the part of National Bank offi cials when disbursing payments.
VI. PARTICIPANTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE PROGRAMME
(What is your view on the programme Juntos?) "They give us 100 soles to eat."
recommendations have yet to be implemented. Due to concerted efforts to avoid politicization of the programme and a focus on reaching some of the poorest and most vulnerable populations, (34) Juntos's achievements to date are noteworthy. Although interviewees admitted some initial skepticism, (35) there was a general consensus among benefi ciaries that the programme is making a positive difference to their lives. For example, in the face of silence by presidential candidates in 2006 about whether they would continue the programme, women benefi ciaries from Ayacucho organized a march in defence of the programme and sent a petition signed by the region's president and district mayors in its support.
(36) This positive attitude was endorsed by interviews with benefi ciaries who conceptualized the programme as an effort to counter extreme poverty for rural families, as God's grace to the poor, or as an attempt to reduce inequalities in living conditions and provide the poor with better opportunities, especially education, to overcome their poverty.
The following discussion provides a more detailed analysis of the ways in which the programme is reducing childhood poverty and vulnerability. It begins by looking at children's time use, the health and nutritionseeking behaviour of children and mothers and shifts in intra-household dynamics. It concludes with a discussion of changes in community dynamics, which have been less positive.
a. Children's time use
Our interviews with programme benefi ciaries as well as programme implementers and local authorities suggested that school attendance in communities where Juntos has been implemented has increased signifi cantly; for example, there was a 20 per cent increase in school attendance in Arizona.
(37) As a result, children's time use has changed. Previously, children's involvement in agricultural work and domestic chores resulted in frequent school absenteeism, but this has been curbed considerably due to the new requirement to be punctual and attend school regularly. Although children still carry out work activities to support their families after school, at the weekends and during the vacations, our research suggested that much of this work has now been absorbed by parents, especially women.
Juntos has also resulted in greater parental involvement in children's education, as there is a growing awareness of the importance of education and the need to support children's learning processes at home. Interviews emphasized that fathers in particular were becoming more involved than previously in their children's education, in part because of greater fi nancial security, and less pressure to work as daily labourers or migrate outside the community for work: (38) "I used to have to leave to fi nd work in other places like Ayacucho, and so, I was rarely home. I would be in the jungle or in the fi elds… but now, I rarely have to do that since the money we are getting is helpful." (Benefi ciary father, Rosaspata)
The need for teachers and school principals to rigorously monitor school attendance due to the new Juntos compliance criteria has in turn indirectly exerted pressure to reduce teacher absenteeism, a major problem in rural schools that clearly compromised the quality of education. Although facilitators do not always have suffi cient clout to enforce rigorous record keeping, and some teachers have been known to accept bribes to falsify student attendance records on behalf of parents, focus group discussions suggested that more frequent surveillance efforts have had a visible impact on teacher attendance.
b. Improved health and nutrition-seeking behaviour
The introduction of Juntos is viewed by health professionals as a positive step, as it is helping to overcome the resistance of poor and vulnerable populations to accessing services.
(39) This is refl ected in the 30 per cent increase in children under the age of one receiving vaccinations in 2006 compared to 2005, the 200 per cent increase in health clinic visits for children under the age of fi ve, and the much higher rate for children aged 5-14 years visiting health clinics for check-ups rather than only in the case of illness. Pre-and post-natal visits have increased by 65 per cent and there has been a reported reduction in home births, which is seen as a priority, given the very high levels of maternal mortality in the area.
Overcoming the alarming rate of malnutrition in the area (60 per cent in Vinchos) is another priority of the health sector. As a result of insistence by programme and health professionals that the Juntos cash transfers should be used to address child malnutrition, families are reporting the purchase of more high-protein foods (e.g. cheese and meat) and fruit:
"…they tell us to eat well and that our mothers have to buy food with that money, they tell us not to let them spend the money on liquor or coca but only on food." (Children, Arizona) "Since mothers have some money saved, they buy food with it. Before, we did not eat meat, if we had a goat, we sold it and used it to buy the many other things we lacked, including school supplies, clothes, some food… Now, we have chickens, goats and pork to eat." (Father's focus group, Arizona)
c. Intra-household dynamics
Juntos has also brought about some important changes in family dynamics, both intended and unintended effects. First, the programme's monthly cash transfer of 100 soles has helped to improve participating household livelihood security to some degree. For example, some households are strategy in Brazil. UNDP has collaborated with Juntos since the initial phase and, in May 2006, the FAO announced its interest in providing fi nancial support to Juntos.
35. Initially, many women distrusted the intentions of the government as the programme differed markedly from the traditional distribution of food typical of Peruvian social programmes, which were habitually subject to clientelism and political manipulation.
36. Continuity of the programme was eventually ratifi ed by Alan Garcia's government in July 2006. Although some programme adjustments were announced, there was to be no substantive change to its design.
37. Due to the absence of a baseline, information records are being developed at a regional level along with a group of indicators that will allow an evaluation of the changes that have been generated since the start of the programme, such as the number of pre-natal checks, number of house births, number of children who have been vaccinated, number of child growth and development checks, number of children registered in school, number of teachers, school drop outs, etc.
38. Another possible reason is that considerably more women than men are illiterate in Ayachucho: 29 per cent of women versus 9.5 per cent of men.
39. This is due in part to the inadequacy of the health sector in working in an inter-cultural context (i.e. with indigenous populations for whom Spanish is commonly not their mother tongue).
using part of the cash not only to improve their living conditions (e.g. buying materials for house repairs or to construct latrines) but also to purchase animals in order to increase their food self-suffi ciency and to sell meat and dairy products: "Some of us didn't have homes. The money is helpful for everything, we are buying building materials and now we are improving our houses… Buying animals is like saving money in a bank account; we buy piglets and when they grow, we have some capital for the future." (Women's focus group, Arizona) However, our research also highlighted that the size of the cash transfer has defi nite limitations. This is especially the case for families with multiple children and in the context of new expenses, such as increased demands from teachers to purchase school-related items and the need to cover transport costs to the district towns to receive the Juntos payment from designated banks.
A second important impact on intra-household dynamics concerns programme attempts to realign gender relations and the gendered division of labour within the family. More specifi cally, Juntos has sought to improve women's bargaining power within the household by reducing their economic dependence and providing them with an independent fi nancial resource. Interestingly, there appears to be a general consensus in the communities where we undertook our study regarding the appropriateness of giving the cash transfers to women, due to their greater level of responsibility and appreciation of children's needs. By contrast, men were perceived to often consume high levels of alcohol and to be uninvolved in children's upbringing: "Sometimes men are very irresponsible, they spend money on drinking. Women see their children's needs, they ask us for school supplies and sometimes their teachers ask for fees to cover various school activities. Women know about these worries, whereas men don't think about these things." (Community facilitator, Arizona) Juntos is, however, also trying to promote greater male involvement in domestic activities and childcare. In general, respondents emphasized that men were now participating in activities previously seen as exclusively female (e.g. cooking, cleaning and washing). In part, this is because women are unable to complete all domestic responsibilities, due to the need to comply with such programme conditions as travelling to the bank to receive the transfers (40) and attending regular capacity-building/awarenessraising workshops. It can also be attributed to an explicit emphasis by local programme implementers that ensuring children's health, nutrition and educational development is the responsibility of both parents: "When she leaves, I have to take care of the kids. It's a little complicated, since previously I didn't believe in doing women's work. Before, I would come home and grumble when dinner wasn't ready, I would tell her 'what do you do all day, you should at least have a meal ready for when I get home'. Now I don't say that to her since I've experienced her responsibilities. I cook, wash the dishes, do the children's laundry, wash them, clean the house and when she suddenly gets home, the food is not ready yet." (laughter) (Interview with a male benefi ciary, Arizona) 40. Initially, women took their children when they went to claim the cash transfers, which meant they missed school; but now the programme demands that women go alone or only take their unweaned babies in order to reduce school absenteeism.
Our interviewees also reported a reduction in domestic violence, related in part to fewer daily survival pressures and the greater negotiating capacity and economic autonomy of women, but also due to a broader campaign to reduce family violence in the region. It is important to note, however, that these changes were not uniform, and in some cases men's support actually decreased and they used the cash to purchase alcohol and coca.
d. Effects on community dynamics
Juntos's targeting process has had a less positive impact on community dynamics. In a context of general poverty, when some families are included and others not and there is insuffi cient clarity about the reasons for this, the introduction of the programme has generated feelings of sadness, resentment and anger among some community members. Especially in the initial stages, the programme suffered from a number of weaknesses in identifying benefi ciaries. Our interviews with non-benefi ciaries suggest that especially vulnerable women, such as single mothers and widows, are often excluded because eligibility is based on aggregate household poverty status rather than on a consideration of the particular vulnerability of some extended families such as single mothers living with relatives.
The most visible effect on community dynamics is that the programme is resulting in marked differences between children and mothers who are programme benefi ciaries and those who are not. Families who do not receive the cash transfers have less opportunity to purchase uniforms and shoes, or give children pocket money to make small purchases, generating a sense of exclusion among children. As one non-benefi ciary girl from Arizona noted: "The ones in Juntos have new clothes. The ones who are not part of Juntos, like us, go to school with torn clothes and with no shoes. We don't have money to buy things like that and it makes us upset…we see that they go to a store and buy cookies and eat fruit. Sometimes we ask our mom for money, but she doesn't have any, at most, she gives us 10 cents."
Interviewees also mentioned that some children do not want to assume responsibilities at school, as they consider that these should be assumed by the benefi ciaries or "...workers of Juntos" as "…they are being paid": "Sometimes, the boys who are not in Juntos complain to the teachers, saying, 'We are not in Juntos, let them [the other students] do it'. Sometimes these students are asked to do chores, such as clean something and they just rebel." (Non-benefi ciary woman, Arizona) This sense of division was not limited to children but was also experienced among some of the women in these communities; whereas community activities are usually open to all and tend to be widely attended, in the case of Juntos community initiatives only Juntos participants are involved, therefore further strengthening the sense of exclusion. Indeed, some key informants feared that there is a risk that these divisions will harm the social fabric of the community. This is of particular concern given that the areas where Juntos is being targeted have a long history of political violence and community tensions: "…being included or not included can generate confl icts in some places, more than in others…Puno, (41) for example, is a complicated zone, confl ictual…I'm not convinced that the programme is taking this situation suffi ciently into account." (Roundtable for Poverty Reduction)
It should not be concluded, however, that the community effects are solely negative. In some cases, the programme has also generated an attitude of solidarity among the benefi ciaries, who seek to share with those who do not receive the cash transfers but who are obviously impoverished.
VII. LINKAGES TO BROADER SOCIAL POLICIES
A growing body of evidence suggests that childhood poverty is a multidimensional phenomenon that is better addressed by an integrated social policy model. (42) Due to Juntos's clear criteria for eligibility, management by a single agency, and a rigorous data collection system, the programme is well-placed to serve as an umbrella framework to coordinate synergies across child-related sectors.
(43) The following section discusses the strengths and weaknesses of Juntos's inter-sectoral efforts to date, especially the need for the programme to be implemented in tandem with initiatives to improve service quality and coverage, as well as the impacts of the programme on understandings and practices of citizenship.
a. Juntos as a means of tackling the multi-dimensionality of childhood poverty?
One of the strengths of the Juntos programme is that it highlights the lack of investment in services in the poorest areas of the country. (44) In the case of the health sector, given that there is no universal health coverage in the country, Ministry of Health (MINSA) documents recognize that the programme offers opportunities for the sector to create synergies with its own objectives, especially in terms of health service coverage for geographically disperse populations. However, one of the weaknesses identifi ed by our interviews at the regional level is that Juntos conditions do not give suffi cient priority to the acquisition and application of practical health knowledge (e.g. constructing better kitchens, latrines, safe water supplies). More importantly, there is a general recognition that the sector was not prepared to cope with the increased demand for health care. Although there was a higher workload and increased paperwork for health workers, increased demand was resulting in poorer quality of services, especially in terms of equipment, human resources and medicines.
In the case of the education sector, the Ministry of Education has a central team integrated within the Juntos structure, four regional coordinators and a network of pedagogical monitors who are in charge of a monitoring system for school attendance. The focus is on addressing educational underachievement and poor-quality educational services in order to break inter-generational transfers of poverty. One critical 41. Puno is another very poor region in the southern highlands where the programme is about to start.
42. See, for example, Harper, C (2005) , "Breaking poverty cycles: the importance of action in childhood", CHIP Briefi ng 8, Save the Children, London, UK.
43. However, the executive director of Juntos is cognizant that the programme fi rst needs to be well established before it can take on this type of umbrella function.
44. As a result, it has secured commitments through international cooperation agreements to invest more in education and health services in affected areas.
mechanism entails the increased monitoring of rural school attendancestudents directly and teachers indirectly, as the latter need to be present in order to keep a record of children's attendance.
Capacity-building initiatives to promote bilingual/inter-cultural education and curricula appropriate to single-teacher schools and multigrade classes, which are the majority in rural zones, have also been introduced. However, greater coverage is also producing problems in terms of capacity to respond to new demand generated by the programme. In particular, several key informants complained of overcrowded classrooms and questioned whether mandatory school attendance was really improving children's ability to learn in the absence of suffi cient teachers.
Similarly, although child protection is a major concern in the country, there are no links to public programmes dealing with child protection, especially the legal protection offi ces for women and children (DEMUNAS).
(45) However, such synergies could help to tackle some of the key barriers to child development: for example, non-enforcement of child support payments can hinder children's uptake of social services or, in the case of violence against children, contribute to school absenteeism and educational under-performance.
Juntos programme documents also discuss the importance of linking with household livelihood and income-generating initiatives to tackle poverty and vulnerability holistically. The aim is to initiate links with other rural development and export programmes so as to promote better economic opportunities for the poorest and most marginalized sectors of the population (employment, access to credit, technical assistance etc.). However, so far, few concrete strategies -apart from assistance in purchasing additional livestock -have emerged.
b. The challenge of intersectoral linkages
Juntos is making important advances in developing an information system on families and children living in poverty. It is generating high-quality data (through the Código Único de Identidad and the social demographic questionnaire on living conditions and access to services), which can be used by other social programmes to avoid overlap/duplication. A committee has been set up especially to identify state investment in zones where Juntos has been initiated. However, there are still urgent information gaps, including the lack of a national database on the real number of children per age group (necessary to overcome problems of exclusion), and inconsistencies between the databases of the Ministry of Health, Juntos and the National Programme of Nutritional Assistance (PRONAA). In addition, in the case of monitoring and evaluation, a baseline is needed in order to evaluate the impacts of the programme.
There is also a widespread view that linkages between local authorities and the programme need to be strengthened. Our interviews suggested that there was a general consensus that there are insuffi cient mechanisms to denounce or claim redress in localities and districts where the programme functions. In particular, some cases suggested the need for the programme to introduce adequate fl exibility to take into account the particular vulnerability of single-headed households and circumstances of exceptional need (e.g. relating to family illness, sudden loss of employment). Informants also saw the policy of silence regarding the national (April 2006) and regional/municipal (November 2006) elections as problematic. The decision was taken not to provide detailed information about programme impacts to external agents and the media in order to avoid attempts at political manipulation, distortion or critiques that could possibly damage the programme's image. However, this meant that there was no space for public debate and that the information needs of diverse societal actors were undermined. It also resulted in marginalizing local authorities from the programme and did not allow opportunities for capacity building, an important concern in the context of Peru's current decentralization process.
c. Changing the relationship between social programmes and citizenry
One of the longer-term aims of Juntos is to change the paternalistic relationship between the citizenry and state-funded social programmes and to present access to basic services for children as a joint responsibility of both parents and the state. Core to this is the idea that in order to ensure that service providers are held accountable for the provision of quality services, citizens have to demonstrate their demand for access to quality services. In order to do this, there is a need to reconceptualize the way the population views government services, from one of largesse to that of fulfi lling its responsibility to meet citizens' economic and social rights. As one interviewee noted: "Juntos is innovative because it interlinks your interests with those of the state: the state is interested in raising the education [al] level of the population and you are interested in rising out of poverty, but it won't be free. The state will give you 100 soles and you will do what you have not always wanted to do, including sending your children -especially girls -to school, as boys and girls have the same rights to an education." (Andrés Solari, local NGO staff member) Our interviews suggested that while some respondents were using the language of rights, this was far from widespread. Many of the women, in particular, knew about the demands of the programme they had to meet, but couched this in terms of tasks to be completed due to instructions from authorities rather than about a balance between citizens' rights and responsibilities:
"To clean, to keep the house clean, the children also have to be clean, they need to bathe and not run around dirty on the streets as before…They also say that we have to cook better …. But the most important thing is to educate our children, for them not to miss school, to send them clean and to take them to the health clinic." (Women's focus group, Rosaspata) However, some male interviewees talked about the notion of reparation, to compensate the poorest population for their unequal standard of living and for having been the victims of political violence: "…surely they have seen we are poor, the people in the fi elds are poor, and nor is it the money of the government, it's returning our money that we have given, because when we buy things, we are paying taxes, so for me I don't see it as a present." (Male focus group, Arizona) "…previously there was no support, at a minimum so children could study, orphans, but now these children who were orphaned as a result of the Shining Path violence, it is important that they can get an education." (Community president, Rosaspata) It is also interesting to note that benefi ciaries and service providers alike believe it is necessary to apply pressure to ensure compliance with the conditions. Yet, while this strategy appears to be effective from a programme management perspective, there is a risk of infantilizing participants if the discourses used to inform them about the conditions focus on compliance rather than on balancing rights and responsibilities. Some of the respondents suggested that discursive practices in our study communities erred towards the former and promoted a submissive attitude that is unlikely to be sustainable over time. This is particularly the case with issues of hygiene, which have traditionally symbolized the social distance between urban and rural populations. While the programme authorities' insistence that women improve their personal appearance, their children's hygiene and their domestic living conditions no doubt have a positive effect, it also results in these women -many of whom had never visited a city prior to joining Juntos -internalizing discourses that they were previously "dirty" and "idle", as the case below illustrates: "This is changing, now we are no longer idle, we clean the house, before we were dirty…now we see that other women are cleaning and so we are ashamed to go around dirty…previously our houses were in disarray, but following the lectures we changed, some of us cook better, not on the fl oor." (Focus group with benefi ciary women, Rosaspata)
It is also worth noting that although many women appreciate the capacity-building opportunities that Juntos provides to become more "advanced/developed", some are already complaining about how timeconsuming their involvement in the programme is. This raises concerns about whether the demands are realistic and not overly burdening women through a steep increase in unpaid work. As Molyneux argues, there is a real risk that conditional cash transfer programmes targeted at mothers are:
"…despite some adaptation to modern conceptions of citizenship, still premised on a gendered construction of social need and, indeed, have the effect of re-traditionalizing gender roles and responsibilities." (46) 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY CHALLENGES
Overall, Peru's new conditional cash transfer programme, Juntos, is recognized as having been effective in its fi rst phase, enjoying support from the international community as well as public and private institutions involved in its implementation. It is reaching populations with among the highest poverty rates in the country, and has largely avoided politicization despite a diffi cult political transition in Peru's fl edgling democratic history. These successes, notwithstanding, our research identifi ed a number of implementation weaknesses and policy challenges that need to be debated by policy actors and urgently addressed, as plans to scale up the programme to other regions are set in motion.
Targeting, social exclusion and poverty dynamics:
• Although considerable efforts have been made in terms of targeting, including the innovative inclusion of communities most affected by prior political violence, some weaknesses in the household targeting approach and community validation process are generating adverse effects on community dynamics. Marked differences are emerging between participants and non-participants, both among adults and children. It will therefore be important to monitor to what extent this divide spills over into other aspects of community participation, given that our research has already identifi ed an emerging unwillingness among non-participants to carry out voluntary work within school and community groups.
• While one possibility for combating this challenge could be to set a higher threshold for excluding participants, this will depend on fi nancing from both domestic revenue and donors and on the sustainability of these sources over time. At a minimum, it will also be necessary to establish information and complaint channels to allow the population to register their concerns. Such a process should consider a mechanism for re-evaluating excluded families, including those with specifi c needs, such as single mothers living in extended family arrangements, and also those who fall into poverty but who were originally screened out. In this regard, it will be important to foster more effective involvement from local authorities, health service personnel and teachers -all of whom are likely to have a deep knowledge of local realities.
Strengthening a rights-based approach:
• The programme promotes joint responsibility between citizens and the state with an emphasis on a balance between civic rights and duties. In practice, however, the relationship established through the conditionality agreement is somewhat paternalistic, and risks infantilizing rural women in particular. A key challenge therefore is to address the disjuncture between national level policy documents and discourses and the way the programme is implemented by front-line staff at the local level. If a culture of citizenship, rights and state accountability is to be fostered, then it will be important to monitor the extent to which programme offi cials are imposing their own conceptions and conditions of "good parenting" and "housekeeping".
• Although reducing gender inequalities was not a specifi c goal of the programme, interestingly there have been some positive spillover impacts of women's greater empowerment within the household that stem from greater fi nancial independence. Not only are some husbands sharing more of the domestic and caring work out of an awareness that complying with the conditionalities will necessitate a joint effort, but a number of women reported a reduction in family violence. It will thus be valuable to monitor these tendencies, in order to better understand the underlying dynamics and to better reinforce positive changes. Moreover, research is needed to understand to what extent women's increased visibility and decision-making power are camoufl aging a greater work burden for women and a reinforcement of traditional social caring roles.
Strengthening inter-sectoral linkages:
• Juntos's inter-sectoral approach represents an important strength of the programme vis-à-vis other social programmes. However, while this approach has allowed for an important degree of information sharing and problem identifi cation to date, an effective articulation of actions transcending sectoral logic has not yet been achieved. One of the fi rst challenges will clearly be to develop a unifi ed effi cient information system to overcome problems of duplication and exclusion in social programmes. Equally important, will be the development of a rigorous monitoring and evaluation system that will help to consolidate learning from the programme and ensure that these lessons are embedded into the design of the programme as it is scaled up to other areas.
• Despite improvements in maternal and child health and increased primary school attendance, service quality improvements have not kept pace with increased demand. The issue of service quality should be tackled as a priority, in order to guarantee effective improvements in human capital and avoid a situation whereby people are compelled through conditionality to use public services that are of little value. Because of over-extension of existing services, an immediate priority will be to ensure adequate fi nancing of these pro-poor sectors to expand coverage in line with demand. In this regard, existing civil society child-sensitive budget analysis and monitoring initiatives should be expanded to focus specifi cally on this issue, not only at the national level but also at sub-national levels. (47) • Child protection from violence and abuse is missing from Juntos's inter-sectoral approach. However, fostering linkages to children's legal protection offi ces (DEMUNAS) that are found throughout the country could foster a more joined-up approach to tackling the multidimensionality of childhood poverty and vulnerability. • Finally, the programme's intention of promoting income-generating strategies is an important one if sustainable poverty reduction is to be achieved, but much work still needs to be done to translate this goal into concrete strategies oriented towards improving productive infrastructure and facilitating access to credit and technical assistance.
